


















































SCOPE FOR DOHA TO REDUCE DISCRIMINATION 












   
 
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STUDIES 
 
The Centre was established in 1989 by the Economics Department of the 
Adelaide University to strengthen teaching and research in the field of 
international economics and closely related disciplines. Its specific objectives 
are: 
 
•   to promote individual and group research by scholars within and outside 
the Adelaide University 
•   to strengthen undergraduate and post-graduate education in this field 
•   to provide shorter training programs in Australia and elsewhere 
•   to conduct seminars, workshops and conferences for academics and for 
the wider community 
•   to publish and promote research results 
•   to provide specialised consulting services 
•  to improve public understanding of international economic issues, 
especially among policy makers and shapers 
 
Both theoretical and empirical, policy-oriented studies are emphasised, with a 
particular focus on developments within, or of relevance to, the Asia-Pacific 










School of Economics 
Adelaide University  
SA 5005 AUSTRALIA 
Telephone: (+61 8) 8303 5672 
Facsimile: (+61 8) 8223 1460 
Email: cies@adelaide.edu.au 
 




ISSN 1445-3746 series, electronic publication 












School of Economics 
University of Adelaide 




















Forthcoming in the UNSW Law Journal 30(2): 349-67, September 2007. SCOPE FOR DOHA TO REDUCE DISCRIMINATION IN 







I   THE ISSUE 
 
The vast majority of the world’s poorest households depend on farming for their 
livelihood, as would many of the rest had prospects in agriculture not been so bleak as to 
force them into non-farm activities in search of a higher income. Earnings from farming 
have been depressed in low-income countries partly because own-country policies 
typically have had a pro-urban, anti-agricultural bias, and partly because richer countries 
(including some developing countries) assist and protect their farmers with import 
barriers and subsidies. Numerous developing country governments have made 
considerable progress over the past two decades in reducing their own sectoral and trade 
policy distortions, and many of them now believe high-income countries should reduce 
their remaining protectionism that harms developing country exports of farm (and textile) 
products. Indeed one of the key difficulties in the World Trade Organization’s (‘WTO’)
1 
current round of multilateral trade negotiations (known as the ‘the Doha Development 
Agenda’) is the fact that developing countries are calling for such commitments on farm 
policies before they will consider offering any further reform commitments of their own.  
 
                                                 
∗   The author was the Lead Economist in the International Trade Unit of the Development Research 
Group at the World Bank from May 2004 to August 2007. He is a Professor of Economics at the University 
of Adelaide as well as Executive Director of the Centre for International Economic Studies in the School of 
Economics at the University of Adelaide. This article is a revision of a paper for the Cornell-Beida 
conference of Dismantling Discrimination in the WTO System, Beijing University, Beijing, 22-24 May 
2006. The author is grateful for Will Martin’s intense collaboration and for funding from World Bank Trust 
Funds provided by the United Kingdom government’s Department for International Development. The 
views expressed are the author’s alone and not necessarily those of the World Bank and its Executive 
Directors, or the countries they represent, nor of the countries providing the trust funds for this research 
project. 
1  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 
1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) (‘WTO Agreement’).  2
II   BACKGROUND 
 
Historically, in the course of their economic development countries have tended to 
gradually shift from taxing to subsidising agriculture, the latter to a greater degree than in 
other sectors (albeit proportionately less so, and at a later stage of development, if the 
country has had a strong comparative advantage in agriculture).
2 Hence, at any point in 
time farmers in poor countries have tended to face depressed terms of trade relative to 
product prices in international markets (notwithstanding some assistance via subsidies for 
fertiliser, credit or irrigation),
3 while the opposite has been true for farmers in rich 
countries.
4 Again the exceptions were rich countries with an extreme comparative 
advantage in agriculture (Australia, New Zealand) and poor countries with an extreme 
comparative disadvantage in agriculture (South Korea, as with Japan earlier, and some 
oil-rich states particularly in the Middle East). Poor-country farmers also were 
disadvantaged by an anti-rural bias in public investments in infrastructure and human 
capital (education, health, agricultural research and development), and sometimes also by 
having to effectively finance urban consumer food subsidy programs.
5 Within the 
agricultural sector of each country, import-competing industries tended to enjoy more 
                                                 
2  Kym Anderson and Yujiro Hayami , The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection: East Asia 
in International Perspective (1986), 2, 16; Peter H Lindert, ‘Historical Patterns of Agricultural Protection’, 
in Peter Timmer (ed), Agriculture and the State (1991) 29, 50-52. 
3  Ashok Gulati and Sudha Narayanan, The Subsidy Syndrome in Indian Agriculture (2003). The 
most extreme cases in the 20
th century of anti-agricultural industrialisation have led not just to 
impoverishment but to massive deaths, with15-20 million in the Soviet Union in the early 1930s: Robert 
Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (1986) 305-6; 17-30 
million in China in 1959-61: Justin Yifu Lin, ‘Collectivization and China’s Agricultural Crisis in 1959-61’ 
(1990) 98 Journal of Political Economy 1228, 1229; Wei Li, and Dennis Tao Yang, ‘The Great Leap 
Forward: Anatomy of a Central Planning Disaster’ (2005) 113 Journal of Political Economy 840, 841); up 
to two million in North Korea in 1995-2000: Daniel Goodkind, and Loraine A West, ‘The North Korean 
Famine and its Demographic Impact’ (2001) 27 Population and Development Review 219, 219-220. On the 
economic causes of these and other famines, such as the Irish potato famine of 1845-51 (1.1 million), the 
Bengal famine of 1943 (three to four million) and the Ethiopian famine of 1984-85 (up to one million) see: 
Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (1981) 52; Martin 
Ravallion, ‘Famine and Economics’ (1997) 35 Journal of Economic Literature 1205, 1205. 
4  Kym Anderson, ‘Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries’ 
(1995) 43 Economic Development and Cultural Change 401, 405, 408. 
5  See Derek Byerlee, and Gustavo Sain, ‘Food Pricing Policy in Developing Countries: Bias 
Against Agriculture or for Urban Consumers?’ (1986) 68 American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
961, 964-6; Per Pinstrup-Andersen (ed.), Food Subsidies in Developing Countries: Cost, Benefits, and 
Policy Options (1988).  3
government support than those that were more competitive internationally.
6  The Krueger 
study also reveals that, at least up to the mid-1980s, direct disincentives for farmers such 
as agricultural export taxes were less important than indirect disincentives in the form of 
import protection for the manufacturing sector or overvalued exchange rates, both of 
which attracted resources away from agricultural industries producing tradable products.
7 
 
This pattern of distortions to incentives has been very wasteful from a global viewpoint, 
and detrimental to the vast majority of the world’s poorest people who are small farmers 
in developing countries whose real incomes are lowered by those policies. Currently less 
than 15 million relatively wealthy farmers in developed countries, with an average of 78 
hectares per worker, are being helped at the expense of not only consumers and taxpayers 
in those rich countries but also the majority of the 1.3 billion relatively impoverished 
farmers and their large families in developing countries who on average have to earn a 
living from just 2.5 hectares per worker (Table 1). Furthermore, the evolution from taxing 
to subsidising farmers as countries develop suggests that, left unchecked, agricultural 
protectionism would continue to spread to newly industrialising countries in the decades 
ahead as governments sought to protect domestic producers from import competition as 
the farm sector came under pressure to shrink in relative terms and, eventually, in terms 
of absolute numbers of people engaged. 
 
True, some developing countries have been granted greater access to developed-country 
markets for a selection of products under various preferential agreements. Examples 
include the European Union’s provisions for former colonies in the Africa, Caribbean and 
Pacific (‘ACP’) program and more recently for least developed countries (‘LDCs’) under 
the Everything But Arms (‘EBA’) agreement. Likewise, the United States has its Africa 
                                                 
6  See, Anne O Krueger, Maurice Schiff and Alberto Valdés, 'Agricultural Incentives in Developing 
Countries: Measuring the Effect of Sectoral and Economy-wide Policies' (1988) 2 World Bank Economic 
Review 255, 264; Roland Herrmann, Patricia Schenck, Rainer Thiele and Manfred Wiebelt, Discrimination 
Against Agriculture in Developing Countries? (1992); Rainer Thiele, ‘The Bias Against Agriculture in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Has it Survived 20 Years of Structural Adjustment Programs?’ (2004) 42 Quarterly 
Journal of International Agriculture 5. 
7  Anne O Krueger, Maurice Schiff and Alberto Valdés, 'Agricultural Incentives in Developing 
Countries: Measuring the Effect of Sectoral and Economy-wide Policies' (1988) 2 World Bank Economic 
Review 255, 261-3.  4
Growth and Opportunity Act (‘AGOA’) and Caribbean Basin Initiative (‘CBI’). While 
these discriminatory schemes reduce demands for developed-country farm policy reform 
from preference-receiving countries, they exacerbate the concerns of other often-equally 
poor countries excluded from such programs and thereby made worse off through 
declining terms of trade – and they may even be worsening rather than improving 
aggregate global and even developing country welfare and poverty alleviation.  
 
 
III    WHAT CONTRIBUTION DID THE GATT MAKE TO DISMANTLING 
AGRICULTURAL DISTORTIONS? 
 
The rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’)
8 are intended, in 
principle, to cover all trade in goods. In practice, however, trade in agricultural products 
was largely excluded from their remit as a consequence of a number of exceptions.
9 This 
is despite the fact that agriculture is a small and declining sector in the global economy; 
its share of global gross domestic product (‘GDP’) has fallen from around one-tenth in 
the 1960s to little more than one-thirtieth today. In developed countries the sector 
accounts for only 1.8 per cent of GDP and only a little more of full-time equivalent 
employment. Mirroring that decline, agriculture’s share of global merchandise trade has 
more than halved over the past three decades, dropping from 22 per cent to 9 per cent. 




In the absence of strong GATT disciplines on agriculture, high and variable rates of 
import protection, together with sporadic export subsidy wars between the United States 
and the European Union, were depressing and destabilising international food prices. 
                                                 
8  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 
1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995); annex 1A (General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade) 1867 UNTS 190. 
9  See, eg, Timothy E Josling, Stefan Tangermann and Thorald K Warley, Agriculture in the GATT 
(1996) 11-20, 105-110, 113-32; Dale E Hathaway and Merlinda D Ingco, ‘Agricultural liberalization and 
the Uruguay Round’, in Kym Anderson and Timothy E Josling (eds), The WTO and Agriculture, Vol. 2 
(2005) 4, 4-5. 
10  World Bank, World Development Indicators (see www.worldbank.org/data/wdi).  5
While the Uruguay Round provided a multi-pronged framework for reducing these 
distortions in farm production and trade, implementing the agricultural reforms agreed to 
in that Round involved only very modest liberalisation – even though that Agreement 
involved a converting all agricultural protection to tariffs and limiting increases in 
virtually all tariffs through tariff bindings. Unfortunately, the process of converting non-
tariff barriers into tariffs (inelegantly termed ‘tariffication’) provided numerous 
opportunities for backsliding that greatly reduced the effectiveness of the agreed 
disciplines.
11 As Figure 1 shows, there was thus very little decline in farm support in 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’) countries from the 
start of implementation of the Uruguay Round agreement in 1995. In addition, in 
developing countries, the option for ‘ceiling bindings’ allowed countries to set their 
bindings at high levels, frequently unrelated to the previously prevailing levels of 
protection. Hence agricultural import tariffs are still very high in both rich and poor 
countries, with bound rates half as high again as ‘most favoured nation’ (‘MFN’) applied 
rates (Table 2). Moreover, an additional form of discrimination in agricultural markets 
was introduced in the Uruguay Round, namely tariff rate quotas (‘TRQs’).
12 However, at 
least agriculture is now in the mainstream of the WTO, and that allowed the other 
agreements in the Uruguay Round to be concluded.  
 
 
IV   WHAT CAN THE WTO DO NOW TO REDUCE AGRICULTURAL 
DISTORTIONS? 
 
Agricultural protection levels remain very high in developed countries, which means far 
more resources have been retained in agricultural production in developed countries – 
                                                 
11  Dale E Hathaway and Merlinda D Ingco, ‘Agricultural Liberalization and the Uruguay Round’ in 
Will Martin and L Alan Winters (eds) The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries (1996) 30, 34-5, 
39-47. 
12  TRQs allow a certain quantity of imports to enter at a low tariff rate but above that rate imports are 
subject to a much higher tariff. The quotas are allocated in various ways, virtually all of them involving 
discrimination among competing import suppliers: Harry de Gorter, and Erika Kliauga, ‘Reducing Tariffs 
versus Expanding Tariff Rate Quotas’, in Kym Anderson and Will Martin (eds), Agricultural Trade Reform 
and the Doha Development Agenda (2006) 117.  6
and hence fewer in developing countries – than would have been the case if protection 
had been phased down in both agriculture and manufacturing simultaneously.  
 
What does available data say about current distortions in merchandise trade? As of 2001, 
the extent of tariff intervention in developing countries was even greater in agriculture 
than not only other primary sectors, but also manufacturing (although less so than in 
high-income countries), according to the Global Trade Analysis Project database at 
Purdue University (Table 3). In the absence of those distortions, incomes of developing 
country farmers would, according to recent global economic modelling, be 3 per cent 
higher on average, despite losing from removal of their own governments’ policies 
(Table 4). Agriculture would contribute almost two-thirds of the global welfare gains 
from such reform, notwithstanding the sector’s tiny share of the global economy. The 
proportion is even higher for Sub-Saharan Africa, where more than three-quarters of its 
welfare gain would come from agriculture (Table 5). 
 
Seven-tenths of those potential global gains from agriculture are accounted for by the 
farm policies of high-income countries, and those policies also account for the majority 
of the overall gains to high-income countries. For developing countries, as much of their 
gain from farm reform would come from South-South agricultural liberalisation as from 
developing countries getting unrestricted access to high-income country markets. That is 
almost equally true in manufacturing in aggregate, despite the big gains from textiles and 
clothing reform ($14 billion from market access in high-income countries compared with 
$9 billion due to South-South textiles trade growth) (Table 5). In other words, reform by 
developing countries is equally as important, in terms of economic welfare gains to the 
South, as is reform by high-income countries. 
 
Of the ‘three pillars’ of agricultural distortions, import market access restrictions 
contribute 93 per cent of the cost of current farm programs globally, with export 
subsidies responsible for just 2 per cent and domestic support programs for 5 per cent.
13  
                                                 
13  Kym Anderson, Will Martin and Ernesto Valenzuela, ‘The Relative Importance of Global 
Agricultural Subsidies and Market Access’ (2006) 5 World Trade Review 357.   7
 
A particularly egregious form of discrimination is due to cotton trade distortions and 
subsidies (which raise producer prices by more than 50 per cent in the United States and 
even more in the European Union). Without them, the price of cotton in international 
markets would rise on average by one-fifth above the 2015 baseline, and cotton output 
and exports from Sub-Saharan Africa would be 44 and 73 per cent larger respectively. 
Indeed cotton is so important in Sub-Saharan Africa, minus South Africa, that it would 
contribute one-quarter of the region’s net gain in agricultural value added from full global 
trade and subsidy liberalisation. The share of all developing countries in global cotton 
exports would be 85 per cent instead of 56 per cent in 2015, further vindicating the 




The above results are for full trade liberalisation. Smaller changes can be expected to 
result from partial reforms of the sort being negotiated currently under the Doha 
Development Agenda (‘DDA’), and several elements of proposals under discussion will 
be discriminatory. How much smaller they would be, and how discriminatory, depends 
crucially on the details of the hoped-for agreement. To get a sense of what matters most, 
some scenarios are explored below. 
A   Some Doha Scenarios 
 
It seems safe to assume agricultural export subsidies would be eliminated by 2013 in any 
likely scenario.
15 That will remove one form of discrimination in agricultural markets, 
and one of the anomalies within the WTO (since export subsidies are not allowed on non-
agricultural goods); but, as just mentioned, it is a relatively small part of the global 
welfare cost of current farm programs. We also assume that domestic support for 
                                                 
14  Kym Anderson and Ernesto Valenzuela, ‘The World Trade Organization’s Doha Cotton Initiative: 
A Tale of Two Issues’ (2007) 30 The World Economy 1281, 1289; see also Daniel A Sumner, ‘Reducing 
Cotton Subsidies: The DDA Cotton Initiative’, in Kym Anderson and Will Martin (eds), Agricultural Trade 
Reform and the Doha Development Agenda (2006) 271.  
15  Kym Anderson, Will Martin and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, ‘Doha Merchandise Trade 
Reform: What’s at Stake for Developing Countries?’ (2006) 20 World Bank Economic Review 169, 
183.  8
agriculture is cut in just four economies: by an average of 28 per cent for the United 
States, 18 per cent for Norway, 16 per cent for the European Union and 10 per cent for 
Australia.
16 More difficult to determine are the likely nature and extent of reductions in 
market access barriers, so a number of scenarios are considered initially for agricultural 
and food products in isolation of non-agricultural tariff cuts, before incorporating also 
some non-agricultural market access. Throughout this section, the WTO usage of the 
term ‘developing countries’ applies when allocating Special and Differential Treatment in 
the form of lesser commitments to reform, which means Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan are all able to enjoy SDT despite their high-income status. 
 
The experiments begin for Scenario 1 with a progressive or tiered reduction formula with 
marginal agricultural tariff rate reductions of 45, 70 and 75 per cent within each of the 
three bands defined by inflection point tariff rates of 15 and 90 per cent for developed 
countries (that is, for low agricultural tariffs the marginal rate of reduction is 45 per cent, 
for medium-level tariffs it is 70 per cent, and for the highest tariffs it is 75 per cent), and 
for developing countries the reductions are 35, 40, 50 and 60 per cent within each of their 
four bands (except least developed countries are not required to undertake any reduction 
commitments). Even these large cuts to bound tariffs (which are about half way between 
those proposed by the United States and the European Union in late 2005 in the lead-up 
to the Hong Kong Ministerial meeting) would lead to the average applied tariffs on 
agricultural and food products in 2015 being only one-third lower globally (10.0 instead 
of 15.2 per cent) and 12.5 instead of 14.2 per cent for developing countries.  
 
Scenario 2 examines the consequences of including ‘Sensitive’ farm products as allowed 
for in the ‘July 2004 Framework Agreement’,
17 with developed countries allowed to treat 
2 per cent of their HS6 agricultural tariff lines (six-digit level of disaggregation of the 
UN’s Harmonized System of tariff line items) as sensitive and, we assume, subject to just 
                                                 
16  This is relative to 2001 levels, for reasons explained in Kym Anderson, Will Martin and 
Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, ‘Doha Merchandise Trade Reform: What’s at Stake for Developing 
Countries?’ (2006) 20 World Bank Economic Review 169, 183-4. 
17  Doha Work Programme – Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WTO Doc 
WT/L/579 (2004) (‘July 2004 Framework’). This was essentially a broad roadmap aimed at reinvigorating 
the Doha Round after failed negotiations at Cancun in 2003; it consisted of general guidelines rather than 
any specific modalities for future negotiations.  9
a 15 per cent tariff cut, and double those proportions of products for both developing and 
least developed countries, in part to incorporate also their demand for ‘Special’ products 
treatment.
18 This would lead to the average agricultural tariff falling only to 13.5 per cent 
in both high-income and developing countries, and would clearly introduce yet another 
form of discrimination within the agricultural sector.  
 
Scenario 3 considers the effects of adding to Scenario 2 a tariff cap of 200 per cent, such 
that any product with a bound tariff in excess of that limit will be subjected to a reduction 
down to that cap rate, which would cause average cuts in agricultural tariffs of 18 per 
cent for both developed and developing countries. This would lead to the average 
agricultural tariff falling considerably more for high-income countries (to 11.5 per cent) 
and but only very slightly more (to 13.3 per cent) for developing countries. 
 
Scenario 4 adds to Scenario 1 the cuts in non-agricultural tariff bindings of 50 per cent in 
developed countries, 33 per cent in developing countries, and zero in least-developed 
countries. That lowers the average tariff on all merchandise from 2.9 per cent in the 
baseline to 1.6 per cent for high-income countries and from 8.4 to 7.5 per cent for 
developing countries.  
 
Finally,  Scenario 5 makes developing (including least-developed) countries full 
participants in the round, undertaking the same reductions in bound (but not necessarily 
applied) tariffs as the developed countries in Scenario 4. That lowers the average tariff on 
all merchandise for developing countries from 8.4 to 6.8 instead of 7.5 per cent, a cut of 
almost one-fifth in this case instead of just one-ninth as in Scenario 4.  
 
B   Estimated Welfare and Trade Effects of Those Scenarios as of 2015 
 
                                                 
18   ‘Sensitive’ farm products are chosen for each country by taking into account the importance of 
the product, the height of its existing tariff, and the gap between its bound and applied tariffs in that 
country: Sebastien Jean, David Laborde and Will Martin, ‘Consequences of Alternative Formulas for 
Agricultural Tariff Cuts’, in Kym Anderson and Will Martin (eds), Agricultural Trade Reform and the 
Doha Development Agenda (2006) 81, 86-8.  10
The welfare consequences of implementing these various reforms over the 2005-2010 
period and allowing the global economy to adjust to 2015 are summarised in Table 6 in 
dollar terms and as percentage changes in real income in 2015.  
 
Column (a)1 of Table 6 suggests that agricultural liberalisation using the harmonising 
formula (Scenario 1) would generate a global gain of $75 billion even without the 
inclusion of non-agricultural tariff reform. However, almost all those benefits accrue to 
the reforming high-income countries (with whom we include protective Korea and 
Taiwan as well as Hong Kong and Singapore in this and subsequent tables) such that 
developing countries would gain only $9 billion because their tariff-binding overhang is 
so great as to lead to almost no cuts in their applied tariffs. Were countries allowed to 
have lesser cuts for even just 2 per cent of their farm products they declare to be 
‘Sensitive’ (and another 2 per cent in developing countries for their ‘Special’ farm 
products), those global gains would shrink to just $18 billion and developing countries as 
a group would be worse off (Scenario 2). If such exceptions are to be made, it would be 
important to exploit the opportunity – provided for in the Ministerial Declaration – to put 
a cap on bound tariffs. Scenario 3 shows that even a cap as high as 200 per cent, would 
restore at least half of the welfare gain foregone by allowing such exceptional treatment 
for ‘Sensitive’ and ‘Special’ farm products. 
 
The final two scenarios add non-agricultural tariff cuts to the agricultural reforms in the 
preceding scenarios. In scenario 4, lesser cuts are provided for developing countries’ non-
agricultural tariffs, as is the case for all the preceding agricultural cut scenarios. Even so, 
the gain to developing countries doubles by adding these non-farm reforms, relative to 
Scenario 1 where only agriculture is cut, contributing one-third of the extra boost to 
global welfare ($7.1 billion out of the $21.6 billion difference between the global gains 
from Scenarios 1 and 4). In Scenario 5, the developing (including least-developed) 
countries fully engage in the reform process, foregoing the lesser cuts provided for in 
Scenarios 1 to 4. That boosts their and global welfare substantially, because their cuts in 
bound tariffs lead to considerably larger cuts in applied tariffs. Nonetheless, the global 
average merchandise tariff hardly changes if there were just agricultural reform, whereas  11
it falls by almost one-third or 1.5 percentage points when manufacturing is included in 
the reform package.  
 
Retaining lesser cuts for developing countries as in Scenario 4 would yield a global gain 
of $96 billion from Doha merchandise liberalisation, which is a sizable one-third of what 
is on the table (the potential welfare gain from full liberalisation of $287 billion, reported 
in Table 5). But for developing countries the gain would be only $16 billion, which is less 
than one-fifth of that group’s potential gain shown in Table 5 of $86 billion. If 
developing countries forego the option of reforming less than developed countries, their 
gain would rise by 42 per cent, or an extra $7 billion. Much of those gains go to the 
largest developing economies, but note that, in percentage terms, Sub-Saharan Africa also 
gains substantially if it liberalises more – contrary to the presumptions of many 
commentators. By contrast, in Scenario 4 the ‘Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa’ countries 
simply are not liberalising enough to get sufficient efficiency gains to offset the terms of 
trade losses suffered either as net food importers, or as recipients of tariff preferences that 
have eroded with the decline in high-income countries’ MFN tariffs, or because of the 
combined export growth from reforming economies with similar export compositions. 
 
How big would be the consequences of partial reform for agricultural net income (value 
added by the farming sector)? Table 7 shows, not surprisingly, that agricultural value 
added would fall in those regions with the highest agricultural protection (Europe, 
Northeast Asia and to a lesser extent the United States). However, in the Doha reform 
scenario none of the developing countries/regions shown in Table 7 would suffer a 
decline in agricultural net income, despite the lowering of their own agricultural tariffs. 
The reason for their farmers faring better than protected rich-country farmers – even 
though the average agricultural tariff in developing countries is nearly as high as that in 
high-income countries (14.2 per cent compared with 15.9 per cent in the baseline) – is 
because a much larger proportion of developing country agriculture is producing 
exportables that do not have to be protected from imports.  
 
  12
V   IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
To realise those potential gains from Doha, it is in agriculture that by far the greatest cuts 
in bound tariffs and subsidies are required. However, the political sensitivity of farm 
support programs, coupled with the complexities of the measures introduced in the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and of the modalities set out in the Ministerial 
Declaration, ensure the devil will be in the details of the final Doha agreement. 
Outlawing agricultural export subsidies is the obvious first step. That will help bring 
agriculture into line with other sectors, and in the process help to limit the extent to which 
governments encourage agricultural production by other means (since it would remove 
one option for, and hence raise the cost of, surplus disposal). Concurrently, domestic 
support bindings must be cut very substantially to reduce binding overhang. Even more 
importantly, agricultural tariff bindings must be cut hugely so that some genuine market 
opening can occur. Yet allowing lesser cuts for even just a few ‘Sensitive’ and ‘Special’ 
farm products would reduce hugely the gains from reform, given the tariff peaks 
currently in place. If it turns out to be politically impossible not to designate some 
products as ‘Sensitive’ and ‘Special’, the resulting welfare cost could be reduced by 
imposing a tariff cap such that any product with a bound tariff in excess of, say, 100 per 
cent would have to reduce it to that cap rate. Expanding non-agricultural market access at 
the same time as reforming agriculture would increase the prospects for a successful 
conclusion to the DDA.  
 
An essential part of the DDA is South-South ‘concessions’, especially for developing 
countries, because that is where half their potential benefits lie. That means reconsidering 
the extent to which developing countries liberalise. Since developing countries are 
trading so much more with each other now than in the 1980s, they are the major 
beneficiaries of reforms within their own regions. Even least developed countries need to 
consider reducing their tariff-binding overhang at least, since doing that in the context of 
the Doha round gives them more scope to demand ‘concessions’ (or compensation for 
preference erosion or other contributors to terms of trade deterioration) from richer 
countries than if they hang on to the opportunity, provided in the July 2004 Framework,  13
not to engage in reform. What emerges from the above analysis is that developing 
countries would not have to reduce actual applied tariffs very much under Doha, because 
of the large gaps between their tariff bindings and applied rates. However, to realise more 
of their potential gains from trade, they would need to commit to additional trade (and 
complementary domestic) reforms, and to invest more in trade facilitation. High-income 
countries could encourage them to do so not only by being willing to open up their own 
markets more to developing country exports but also by providing more targeted aid.  
 
 
VI   CONCLUSION 
 
Even with the above reforms, numerous discriminatory features in agricultural markets 
will remain and others will be added – despite non-discrimination being a core WTO 
guiding principle. They include the continuing use of tariff rate quotas (for which no 
appetite for abolition has emerged, thanks to the rents they generate for exporters), the 
broadening of Special and Differential Treatment for developing and least-developed 
countries, the offering by a greater number of high-income countries of duty-free access 
for UN-designated least developed countries (thereby harming the much-larger number of 
producers in other low-income countries), the formal exceptional treatment of an as-yet-
unspecified number of ‘Sensitive’ and ‘Special’ agricultural products that will be 
subjected to less reform, and a prospective broadening of the use of geographical 
indications beyond wine and spirits.  
 
Furthermore, new forms of agricultural protectionism have been emerging. Food safety 
concerns have been used to erect barriers that discriminate against countries that adopt 
some new agricultural technologies (most notably the use of animal growth hormones 
and of transgenic varieties of crop seeds). Environmental, food security and regional  14
development concerns also have been used to justify greater supports for farmers (under 
the name of agricultural ‘multifunctionality’).
19  
 
Behind these clouds are some silver linings though. One of the benefits of countries 
opening up to foreign direct investment over the past two decades has been the global 
supermarket revolution. This is affecting not just the retailing of food but also the ways in 
which farm products are procured, processed, transported and distributed potentially 
throughout the year even for seasonal fresh fruits and vegetables.
20 The multinational 
firms involved in this revolution will be imposing high standards on farmers, but at the 
same time they are a force for greater market access opening in importing countries and 
for greater rural infrastructure in exporting countries. The gradual ‘thickening’ of 
international markets for horticultural and other farm products that will result from this 
trend will bring greater stability to international food prices, further reducing the need for 
countries to maintain trade barriers for domestic market stabilisation reasons. 
 
                                                 
19  Timothy E Josling, Stefan Tangermann and Thorald K Warley, Agriculture in the GATT (1996), 
232-41; Kym Anderson, ‘Bringing Discipline to Agricultural Policy  via the WTO’, in Kym Anderson and 
Timothy E Josling (eds), The WTO and Agriculture, Vol. 2 (2005), 124. 
20  Kym Anderson, ‘Measuring Distortions to Agricultural Incentives: Beyond Tariffs’ (Paper 
presented at the Summer Symposium of the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium 




Figure 1: Farm producer support estimate (‘PSE’), high-income (OECD member) 
countries, 1986 to 2003  
 





































 Source: Producer and Consumer Support Estimates, OECD Database 1986-2003 (2004) 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_37401_32264698_119656_1_1_37
401,00.html> at 1 July 2007.  17
Table 1: Agricultural indicators for developed market economies, Europe’s economies in transition, and developing economies 
 
 

































































WORLD 5,230 6.1 1,327 6.2 1050  0.82 3.8 414
[40%]
414 18
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, The State of Food and Agriculture 2003-2004 (2004) 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/Y5160E/Y5160E00.HTM> at 30 July 2007.  Table 2: Agricultural weighted average import tariffs, by region, 2001 
(per cent, ad valorem equivalent, weights based on imports) 
 
  





      
Developed countries  27  22  14 
Developing countries  48  27  21 
    of which: LDCs  78 14  13 
WORLD 37  24  17 
 
a Includes preferences and in-quota TRQ rates where relevant, as well as the ad valorem 
equivalent of specific tariffs. Developed countries include Europe’s transition economies 
that joined the European Union in April 2004. The ‘developing countries’ definition used 
here is that adopted by the WTO and so includes East Asia’s four newly industrialised 
economies. 
 
Source: Sebastien Jean, David Laborde and Will Martin, ‘Consequences of Alternative 
Formulas for Agricultural Tariff Cuts’, in Kym Anderson and Will Martin (eds), 
Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda (2006) 81, Table 
4.2.   2
Table 3: Import-weighted average applied tariffs, by sector and region, 2001 
(per cent) 
Importing region: 






High-income countries  16.2  1.0  1.9 
Developing countries  17.9  6.5  10.1 
Asia 29.2  8.2  12.3 
China 37.6  5.9  13.1 
Indonesia 5.0  3.4  5.0 
Malaysia 17.1  5.1  4.6 
Philippines 9.5  3.6  2.2 
Singapore 0.4  0.0  0.0 
Thailand 29.4  4.6  9.6 
Vietnam 36.6  10.0  15.4 
Bangladesh 12.6  22.8  19.3 
India 50.2  21.2  27.6 
Sri Lanka  14.4  5.9  4.6 
Latin America & Car.  10.1  5.1  7.8 
Mexico 11.5  4.4  4.5 
Colombia 10.3  7.6  9.8 
Peru 15.9  9.9  11.6 
Venezuela 11.8  12.2  12.2 
Rest of Andean Pact  9.6  6.3  7.7 
Argentina 6.9  6.3  10.7 
Brazil 5.0  3.7  11.3 
Chile 6.8  6.9  6.3 
Uruguay 4.1  2.7  7.8 
Rest of South America  8.9  3.6  7.4 
Central America  8.6  4.0  7.7 
Rest of FTAA  14.0  8.4  11.0 
Rest of the Caribbean  10.4  2.4  10.0 
Africa 19.3  12.5  17.2 
Morocco 29.3  15.2  21.9 
Tunisia 51.7  11.3  13.2 
Botswana 4.5  0.5  2.2 
South Africa  8.9  2.4  7.3 
Malawi 11.1  7.0  10.4 
Mozambique 13.3  6.7  10.2 
Tanzania 19.2  10.4  14.0 
Zambia 9.4  6.7  8.3 
Zimbabwe 27.2  8.5  13.6 
Madagascar 3.7  1.7  4.0 
Uganda 8.2  4.5  5.4 
Rest of Sth African CU  4.8  1.2  2.9 
Rest of SADC  27.2  15.9  21.1 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Afr  21.4  14.9  15.2 
Rest of North Africa  10.4  15.5  25.4 
Source: GTAP Version 6.05 database, Global Trade Analysis Project (2007) 
<http://www.gtap.org> at 13 August 2007.  3
Table 4: Effects of full liberalisation of global agricultural and other merchandise 
trade on agricultural value added, by country/region, 2015 
 
(relative to baseline, 2001 dollars and per cent) 
 
















country   











Australia and New Zealand  2.5  3.2  6.4  10.1  13.0  25.6 
EU 25 plus EFTA  7.3  -42.0  -39.1  4.9  -28.3  -26.4 
United States  5.1  -20.7  -18.2  4.2  -17.0  -15.0 
Canada  2.0  1.4  3.4  13.3  9.6  23.3 
Japan  0.2  -17.7  -17.7  0.4  -39.6  -39.5 
Korea and Taiwan  0.5  -10.1  -9.5  1.7  -35.4  -33.3 
Hong Kong and Singapore  0.1  0.1  0.1  3.6  5.0  7.5 
Argentina 0.4  4.9  6.1  2.1  27.4  33.8 
Bangladesh -0.4  0.2  -0.5  -3.3  1.7  -4.4 
Brazil 0.0  15.1  15.1  0.1  46.2  46.3 
China -16.3  13.3  0.3  -3.8  3.1  0.1 
India -17.3  2.9  -17.1  -8.2  1.4  -8.1 
Indonesia -0.1  1.0  0.8  -0.4  3.3  2.7 
Thailand 1.1  3.1  3.8  7.2  20.4  25.0 
Vietnam 0.9  0.3  0.8  14.5  5.7  13.6 
Russia -1.8  0.7  -1.4  -8.4  3.2  -6.5 
Mexico -3.8  7.9  0.9  -9.9  20.9  2.5 
South Africa  0.1  0.4  0.5  1.3  7.8  9.6 
Turkey -2.9  0.9  -2.0  -10.3  3.0  -7.2 
Rest of South Asia  -1.7  1.2  -0.6  -3.7  2.7  -1.3 
Rest of East Asia  -1.4  1.2  -0.2  -5.5  4.6  -0.7 
Rest of LAC  1.9  19.7  22.9  2.5  26.0  30.2 
Rest of ECA  -2.1  1.4  -1.1  -3.3  2.3  -1.8 
Middle East and North Africa  -4.8  6.2  0.3  -4.4  5.6  0.3 
Selected SSA countries  0.4  1.1  1.5  2.7  6.5  9.1 
Rest of Sub Saharan Africa  -0.7  3.0  2.3  -1.7  7.2  5.4 
Rest of the World  0.7  2.5  3.1  3.4  13.2  16.4 
High-income countries  17.6  -85.8  -74.6  4.6  -22.3  -19.4 
Developing countries  -47.9  87.1  35.6  -3.9  7.0  2.9 
Middle-income countries  -29.6  74.8  45.3  -3.4  8.7  5.3 
Low-income countries  -18.2  12.3  -9.7  -4.8  3.2  -2.5 
East Asia and Pacific  -15.8  18.9  5.5  -3.2  3.8  1.1 
South Asia  -19.4  4.4  -18.1  -7.2  1.6  -6.8 
Europe and Central Asia  -6.8  3.0  -4.5  -6.0  2.6  -4.0 
Middle East and North Africa  -4.8  6.2  0.3  -4.4  5.6  0.3 
Sub Saharan Africa  -0.2  4.5  4.3  -0.3  7.1  6.7 
Latin America and the Caribbean  -1.4  47.7  45.0  -0.9  29.0  27.4 
World total  -30.3  1.3  -39.0  -1.9  0.1  -2.4 
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Source: Kym Anderson, Will Martin and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, ‘Distortions 
to World Trade: Impacts on Agricultural Markets and Farm Incomes’ (2006) 28 Review 
of Agricultural Economics 168, Table 12.  5
Table 5: Regional and sectoral source of gains from full liberalisation of global 
merchandise trade and agricultural subsidy policies, developing and high-
income countries, 2015 
 (Change in real income in 2015 relative to baseline scenario) 
  Gains by region in $billion  Per cent of regional loss  


















income  World 
             
Developing countries liberalise:          
Agriculture and food  28 19 47 33 34 35  9 17 
Textiles and clothing  9 14 23 10 12 11  7 8 
Other merchandise  6 52 58  7  1 14 26 20 
All sectors  43 85  128 50 47 60 42 45 
          
High-income countries liberalise:          
Agriculture and food  26 109 135  30  31 43 54 47 
Textiles and clothing  13  2 15 15 15 -0  1 5 
Other merchandise  4 5 9 5 7 -3  2 3 
All sectors  43 116 159  50  53 40 57 55 
          
All countries liberalise:          
Agriculture and food  54 128 182  63  65 78 64 63 
Textiles and clothing  22 16 38 25 27 11  8 14 
Other merchandise  10 57 67 12  8 11 28 23 
All sectors  86 201 287 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
a Small interaction effects are distributed proportionately and numbers are rounded to 
sum to 100 per cent 
 
Source: Kym Anderson, Will Martin and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, ‘Distortions 
to World Trade: Impacts on Agricultural Markets and Farm Incomes’ (2006) 28 Review 
of Agricultural Economics 168, Table 4.  6
Table 6: Change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios, 2015 
(2001 $billion and percentage changes from baseline) 
  (a) Dollar change    (b) Percentage change 
  Scen. 1  Scen. 2  Scen. 3 Scen. 4 Scen. 5   Scen. 1  Scen. 2  Scen. 3  Scen. 4  Scen. 5 
Australia & New Zealand  2.0  1.1  1.2  2.4  2.8    0.35  0.20  0.20  0.42  0.48 
EU 25 plus EFTA  29.5  10.7  10.9  31.4  35.7    0.29  0.11  0.11  0.31  0.36 
United States  3.0  2.3  2.1  4.9  6.6    0.02  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.05 
Canada  1.4  0.5  0.4  0.9  1.0    0.15  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.11 
Japan  18.9  1.8  12.9  23.7  25.4    0.38  0.04  0.26  0.48  0.51 
Korea and Taiwan  10.9  1.7  15.9  15.0  22.6    0.86  0.13  1.26  1.19  1.79 
Hong Kong and Singapore  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  1.5  2.2    -0.02  -0.03  -0.04  0.35  0.52 
Argentina  1.3 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.6    0.32 0.26 0.26 0.34 0.39 
Bangladesh  0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.1  -0.1    -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.09 
Brazil  3.3 1.1 1.1 3.6 3.9    0.50 0.16 0.17 0.55 0.59 
China  -0.5 -1.5 -1.1  1.7  1.6    -0.02 -0.06 -0.04  0.07  0.06 
India  0.2 0.2 0.2 2.2 3.5    0.02 0.03 0.02 0.25 0.40 
Indonesia  0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 1.2    0.05 0.07 0.01 0.37 0.44 
Thailand  0.9 0.6 0.8 2.0 2.7    0.43 0.29 0.38 0.99 1.33 
Vietnam  -0.1  0.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6    -0.20 -0.09 -0.16 -0.83 -0.97 
Russia  -0.3 -0.7 -0.7  0.8  1.5    -0.06 -0.16 -0.15  0.16  0.31 
Mexico  -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 -0.2    -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 
South  Africa  0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7    0.06 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.49 
Turkey  0.6 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.4    0.25 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.55 
Rest of South Asia  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.7    0.13  0.05  0.14  0.17  0.39 
Rest of East Asia  0.1  0.0  1.0  0.3  0.6    0.02  0.01  0.36  0.09  0.22 
Rest of LAC  3.7  0.5  0.4  3.9  4.0    0.44  0.06  0.04  0.46  0.47 
Rest of ECA  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -0.6  -0.7    -0.06  -0.09  -0.08  -0.22  -0.26 
Middle East & N. Africa  -0.8  -1.2  -1.2  -0.6  0.1    -0.07  -0.10  -0.10  -0.05  0.01 
Selected SSA countries  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2    0.21  -0.02  -0.05  0.19  0.26 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.0  -0.3  -0.3  -0.1  0.3    0.02  -0.13  -0.14  -0.02  0.13 
Rest of the World  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.6    0.19  0.00  0.02  0.26  0.28 
High-income  countries  65.6 18.1 43.2 79.9 96.4    0.20 0.06 0.13 0.25 0.30 
WTO  Dev.  countries  19.7  1.2 16.8 32.6 47.7    0.17 0.01 0.14 0.27 0.40 
Developing countries (WB)  9.0 -0.4  1.1 16.1 22.9    0.09 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.22 
   Middle-income countries  8.0  -0.5  1.0  12.5  17.1    0.10  -0.01 0.01 0.15 0.21 
      Low-income  countries  1.0 0.1 0.0 3.6 5.9    0.05 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.30 
   East Asia and Pacific  0.5  -0.8  0.6  4.5  5.5    0.01  -0.02 0.02 0.13 0.16 
      South  Asia  0.4 0.3 0.4 2.5 4.2    0.03 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.36 
   Europe and Central Asia  0.1  -0.9  -0.9  0.8  2.1    0.01 -0.09 -0.09  0.08  0.21 
   Middle East & N. Africa  -0.8  -1.2  -1.2  -0.6  0.1    -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05  0.01 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  0.3  0.0  -0.1  0.4  1.2    0.06 -0.01 -0.02  0.10  0.27 
   Lat. America & the Carib.  8.1  2.3  2.1  7.9  9.2    0.29 0.08 0.08 0.29 0.33 
World  total  74.5 17.7 44.3 96.1  119.3    0.18 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.28 
 
Source: Kym Anderson, Will Martin and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, ‘Doha 
Merchandise Trade Reform: What’s at Stake for Developing Countries?’ (2006) 20 World 
Bank Economic Review 169, Table 3. 
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Table 7: Impact of reform scenarios on agricultural value added, 2015 
 




Source: Kym Anderson,  Will Martin and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, ‘Doha 
Merchandise Trade Reform: What’s at Stake for Developing Countries?’ (2006) 20 World 
Bank Economic Review 169, Table 4. 












Australia and New Zealand  6.4  2.4  25.6  9.8 
EU 25 plus EFTA  -39.1  -20.4  -26.4  -13.8 
United States  -18.2  -6.3  -15.0  -5.2 
Canada  3.4  0.9  23.3  5.8 
Japan  -17.7  -7.4  -39.5  -16.6 
Korea and Taiwan  -9.5  -3.4  -33.3  -12.1 
Hong Kong and Singapore  0.1  0.0  7.5  1.4 
Argentina  6.1 1.7 33.8 9.4 
Bangladesh  -0.5 0.0 -4.4 0.4 
Brazil  15.1 5.5 46.3  16.7 
China 0.3  1.8  0.1  0.4 
India  -17.1 0.4 -8.1 0.2 
Indonesia 0.8  0.5  2.7  1.7 
Thailand  3.8 1.1 25.0 7.2 
Vietnam  0.8 0.0 13.6 0.3 
Russia -1.4  -0.2  -6.5  -0.8 
Mexico 0.9  1.2  2.5  3.2 
South Africa  0.5  0.1  9.6  1.2 
Turkey -2.0  -0.1  -7.2  -0.3 
Rest of South Asia  -0.6  0.8  -1.3  1.8 
Rest of East Asia  -0.2  0.5  -0.7  1.9 
Rest of LAC  22.9  8.4  30.2  11.1 
Rest of ECA  -1.1  -0.1  -1.8  -0.2 
Middle East and North Africa  0.3  1.0  0.3  0.9 
Selected SSA countries  1.5  0.3  9.1  1.7 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  2.3  0.8  5.4  1.9 
Rest of the World  3.1  1.0  16.4  5.4 
High-income countries  -74.6  -34.2  -19.4  -8.9 
Developing countries (WB)  35.6 24.8  2.9  2.0 
   Middle-income countries  45.3  20.9  5.3  2.4 
   Low-income countries  -9.7  3.9  -2.5  1.0 
   East Asia and Pacific  5.5  3.9  1.1  0.8 
   South Asia  -18.1  1.2  -6.8  0.5 
   Europe and Central Asia  -4.5  -0.3  -4.0  -0.3 
   Middle East and North Africa  0.3  1.0  0.3  0.9 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  4.3  1.1  6.7  1.8 
   Latin America and the Caribbean  45.0  16.7  27.4  10.2 
World total  -39.0  -9.5  -2.4  -0.6 CIES DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
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